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Abstract
We study a model of local evolution. Agents are located on a network and interact strate-
gically with their neighbours. Strategies are chosen with the help of learning rules that are
based on the success of strategies observed in the neighbourhood.
The standard literature on local evolution assumes learning rules to be exogenous and
fixed. In this paper we consider a specific evolutionary dynamics that determines learning
rules endogenously.
We find with the help of simulations that in the long run learning rules behave rather
deterministically but are asymmetric in the sense that while learning they put more weight
on the learning players’ experience than on the observed players’ one. Nevertheless stage
game behaviour under these learning rules is similar to behaviour with symmetric learning
rules.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we want to study how strategies evolve simultaneously with learning1 rules in a lo-
cal environment. We regard this paper as a modification of models of local evolution where only
strategies may evolve, but learning rules are kept fix. The latter kind of models has been stud-
ied by Axelrod (1984, p. 158ff), Lindgren and Nordahl (1994), Nowak and May (1992, 1993),
Nowak, Bonhoeffer and May (1993), Eshel, Samuelson and Shaked (1996), and Kirchkamp
(1995). In these models players play games against neighbours, using a strategy that they may
change from time to time. When changing this strategy they use a fixed rule; normally they
either imitate the strategy of the most successful neighbour or the strategy with the highest av-
erage success in their neighbourhood respectively. Both rules seem to be rather plausible, and
both rules lead to a nice explanation for the survival of cooperation in prisoners’ dilemmas: A
cluster of mutually cooperating players may seem to be more successful than a (neighbouring)
cluster of mutually defecting players. Given myopic imitation the idea of cooperation spreads
through a network.
However, this property depends on the assumed learning rule. Other learning rules,
e.g. players that imitate with probabilities that are strictly proportional to the success of the
observed strategies, do not give this explanation for the survival of cooperation. Such propor-
tional imitation rules may actually be viewed as particularly plausible since proportional rules
turn out to be optimal at least in a global setting where all members of a population are equally
likely to interact with each other (see Bo¨rgers and Sarin (1995), Schlag (1993, 1994)).
Notice that local evolution is, thus, much more sensitive to seemingly innocuous changes
of the learning rule than global evolution. This sensitivity makes the local setup particularly
attractive to study selection of learning rules. To perform this task we have to decide whether
we want to extend Bo¨rgers and Sarin or Schlag and search learning rules that are optimal in
a local environment or whether we want to extend local evolution of strategies to include also
learning rules. In this paper we take the second approach and study a model with evolution both
on the level of strategies and on the level of learning rules.
Within the (wide) range of models of local evolution some (Sakoda 1971, Schelling 1971)
assume players’ states to be fixed and concentrate on the movements of players. Oth-
ers (Axelrod 1984, May and Nowak 1992, May and Nowak 1993, Bonhoeffer, May, and
Nowak 1993, Ellison 1993, Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked 1996, Lindgreen and Nordahl 1994,
Kirchkamp 1995) take players’ positions as fixed but allow players to change their states.
1Given that there are lots of definitions for ‘learning’ let us start with a clarifying remark: When we talk about
learning in the following we have in mind a descriptive definition of learning in the sense of a relative permanent
change of behavioural potentiality (see G. Kimble (Hilgard, Marquis, and Kimble 1961)). We restrict our attention
to very simple learning rules. In particular we do not aim to provide a model of learning as a cognitive process.
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Furthermore there are models where players are allowed to move and to change their state
(Hegselmann 1994, Ely 1995). Another distinction is that some authors (like Sakoda, Schelling
and Ellison) assume myopically optimising players while others (Axelrod; Nowak, Bonhoeffer,
May; Eshel, Samuelson, Shaked; Kirchkamp; Lindgren, Nordahl) assume that players learn
through imitation.
In the following we restrict ourselves to players who have fixed positions and who change
their strategy using a rule that is based on imitation. Thus, our model has more elements in
common with Axelrod; Nowak, Bonhoeffer, May; Eshel, Samuelson, Shaked; Kirchkamp; and
Lindgren and Nordahl. This literature assumes all players to use a fixed learning rule that either
copies from the current neighbourhood the strategy of the neighbour that is most successful2
or the strategy that is on average (over all neighbours who use it) most successful. In contrast
we want to allow players to change their own learning rule using a process that is based on
imitation.
Such a dynamics yields a set of learning rules that we can compare with the exogenously given
learning rules from the literature. Further we can compare the stage game behaviour of a popu-
lation using endogenous learning rules with the stage game behaviour of a population with fixed
learning rules.
Regarding the literature on local evolution we want to ask two questions: First we want
to know whether the learning rules discussed in the above literature are likely to be selected
by evolution. Second we want to know whether the behaviour of a society with endogenous
learning rules is different from the behaviour of one with a fixed learning rule. In this paper we
present simulation results to give an answer to these questions.
Another useful benchmark is the literature that studies properties of optimal learning rules
in a global environment, i.e. an environment where all players may interact with each other
and learn from each other. This kind of problem is studied by Binmore and Samuelson (1994),
Bo¨rgers and Sarin (1995), Schlag (1993, 1994). Binmore and Samuelson already require sym-
metry and study an aspiration level that is subject to a noisy evolutionary process. Bo¨rgers and
Sarin as well as Schlag look for an optimal learning rule and find that such a learning rule (in
a global context) turns out to be symmetric, in the sense that learning players put equal weight
on their own as well as on other players’ experience. Further, global learning rules that are
optimal or that survive in the long run turn out to be linear in the sense that optimal learning
rules require learning players to switch to an observed strategy with a probability that is a linear
function of the player’s own and the observed payoff.
In the next section we describe a model of local endogenous evolution of learning rules. In
2We understand here ‘success’ as ‘average payoff per interaction’.
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section 3 we discuss properties of these learning rules. Section 3.4 analyses the dependence
of our results on parameters of the model. In section 3.5 we then study the implication of
endogenous learning on the stage game behaviour. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Overview
In the following we study a population of players each occupying one cell of a torus of size 
where  is between  and 	
 . Players play games with their neighbours on this network, learn
repeated game strategies from their neighbours and update their learning rule using information
from their neighbours. In the remainder of this section we describe the kind of games players
play, and strategies and learning rules they use.
2.2 Stage Games
Players play games within a neighbourhood. In the simulations that we discuss in the following
such a neighbourhood has one of the following shapes:
 


(1)
A player (marked as a black circle) may only interact with those neighbours (gray) which live
no more than  cells horizontally or vertically apart. In each period a random draw decides
for each neighbour independently whether an interaction takes place. Thus, in a given period a
player may sometimes interact with all neighbours, sometimes with only some, sometimes even
with no neighbour at all. Each possible interaction with a given neighbour takes place in each
period independently from all other interactions with probability   . A typical value for   is


 . This probability is low enough to avoid synchronisation among neighbours, it is still high
enough to make simulations sufficiently fast. We consider values for   ranging from 

 
 to
 to test the influence of this parameter.
We assume that games which are played among neighbours change every 
 periods. We
change games to create the necessity to adapt to a changing environment and, thus, induce
evolutionary pressure on learning rules. In the following we present results of simulations
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Figure 1: The space of considered games.
where * ranges from 200 to 20 000 periods. Once a new game is selected, all neighbours in
our population play the same symmetric    game of the following form:
Player +,+
Player
+
- .
- /
/
0

1
.
1
0



(2)
When a new game is selected the parameters
/
and 1 in the above game are chosen randomly
following an equal distribution over the intervals 0 32
/
24
and 0  2 1 2  . We can
visualise the space of games in a two-dimensional graph (see figure 1).
The range of games described by 0 52
/
26
and 0  2 1 2  includes both prisoners’
dilemmas and coordination games. All games with
/87:9
0
	;

< and 1
7=9

;>
< are prisoners’
dilemmas ( -?-A@CB in figure 1), all games with
/ED
0

and 1 2  are coordination games.
In figure 1 equilibrium strategies are denoted with .F. , .F- , -G. and -G- respectively. The
symbol riskH denotes risk dominance for games that have several equilibria.
We already know from the literature on local evolution3 that with the learning rule ‘copy
best player’ players cooperate at least in some prisoners’ dilemmas. Kirchkamp (1995) points
further out that when playing coordination games using this learning rule players do not always
coordinate on the risk dominant equilibrium but follow a criterion which puts also some weight
3See Axelrod (1984, p. 158ff), Lindgren and Nordahl (1994), Nowak and May (1992, 1993), Nowak, Bonho-
effer and May (1993), Eshel, Samuelson and Shaked (1996), Kirchkamp (1995).
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on Pareto dominance. We will see in the remainder of this paper that this behaviour persists at
least to some degree also with endogenous learning rules.
2.3 Repeated Game Strategies
We assume that each player uses a single repeated game strategy against all neighbours. Re-
peated game strategies are represented as (Moore) automata with a maximal number of states of
one, two, three, or four4. For many simulations we limit the number of states to less than three.
2.4 Learning Rules
From time to time a player has the opportunity to revise his or her repeated game strategy. We
assume that this opportunity is a random event that occurs for each player independently at the
end of each period with a certain probability. Probabilities to learn will be denoted 
 JI and
range from 

K to 

 	 . I denotes then the average time between two learning events of a
player. Learning is a relatively rare event, as compared to interaction. Still, learning occurs
more frequently than changes of the stage game and updates of the learning rule itself (see
below).
If a player updates the repeated game strategy the player samples randomly one member of
the neighbourhood and then applies the individual learning rule.
Notice, that this learning rule uses information on a single sampled player. The learning
rules discussed in the literature5 use information on all neighbours from the learning neigh-
bourhood simultaneously.
We assume here that only a single player is sampled to simplify our learning rule in the
sense that only a single alternative to the player’s current repeated game strategy is considered.
It is hard to specify a space of learning rules that learn from several neighbours but can still be
described with a small number of parameters.
4Each ‘state’ of a Moore automaton is described by a stage-game strategy and a transition function to either the
same or any other of the automaton’s states. This transition depends on the opponent’s stage-game strategy. Each
automaton has one ‘initial state’ that the automaton enters when it is used for the first time.
There are 2 automata with only one state (one of them plays initially L and remains in this state whatever the
opponent does, the other plays always M .
There are 26 automata with one or two states. E.g. ‘grim’ is a two-state automaton. The initial state plays L .
The automaton stays there unless the opponent plays M . Then the automaton switches to the second state that plays
M and stays there forever. Other popular two-state automata include ‘tit-for-tat’, ‘tat-for-tit’, etc.
The set of automata with less than four states contains 1752 different repeated game strategies. The set of
automata with less than five states has already size 190646.
5See Axelrod (1984, p. 158ff), Lindgren and Nordahl (1994), Nowak and May (1992, 1993), Nowak, Bonnho-
effer and May (1993), Eshel, Samuelson and Shaked (1996), Kirchkamp (1995).
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We briefly analyse two alternative setups in order to test sensitivity with respect to the type of
the learning rule.
First, and in order to be comparable with the above mentioned literature, we study in section
3.5 a fixed learning rule that samples a single player and that aims to be similar to the fixed
multi-player rules in the literature. With the help of simulations we show that stage game
behaviour under the fixed single-player rule turns out to be very similar to fixed multi-player
rules. E.g. cooperation in prisoners’ dilemmas occurs with the learning rule ‘copy best player’
for almost the same range of games, regardless whether only one or all neighbours are sampled.
Second, and in order to show that choosing the single-player setup is not crucial for the
properties of the learning rules that we derive, we compare in section 3.4.1 the single-player
rule with the following multi-player rule: All neighbours are sampled, the most successful
neighbour is determined, and then imitated with a probability that is again a linear function of
the most successful neighbour’s and the learning player’s success. It turns out that the learning
rules that evolve under this regime are very similar to those that emerge under the single-player
regime that we describe in the next paragraph.
Learning, as well as interaction, occurs in neighbourhoods of similar shape (see graph 1 on
page 3). We denote the size of the neighbourhood for learning with the symbol  I .
Learning rules use the following information:
1. The learning player’s repeated game strategy.
2. The payoff N own of the player’s repeated game strategy, i.e. the average payoff per inter-
action that the player received while using this repeated game strategy.
3. A sampled player’s repeated game strategy.
4. The sampled player’s repeated game strategy payoff N samp, i.e. the average payoff per
interaction that the player received while using this repeated game strategy.
Learning rules are characterised by a vector of three parameters
9PO
Q$R
;
O
QTS
;
O
Q$U
<
7 V
. Given a
learning rule
9PO
QffiR
;
O
QTS
;
O
QffiU
< a learning player samples one neighbours’ strategy and payoff and
then switches to the sampled strategy with probability

9
N own
;
N samp <
XW
O
Q$RZY
O
QTS
N own
Y
O
Q$U
N samp [ (3)
where
W]\
[^

 if \
D

 if \52 
\
otherwise
_ (4)
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N own and N samp denote the player’s and the neighbour’s payoff respectively.
Thus, the two parameters
O
QTS and
O
Q$U
reflect sensitivities of the switching probability to
changes in the player’s and the neighbour’s payoff. The parameter
O
Q$R
reflects a general readi-
ness to change to new strategies, which can be interpreted as a higher or lower inclination to
make an experiment or to try something new. Choosing
9CO
Q$R ;
O
QTS ;
O
Q$U
< a player determines a
range of payoffs where to react probabilistically (i.e. 
9
N own
;
N samp < 7X9 
;>
< ), a second range
of payoffs where switching will never occur (i.e. 
9
N own
;
N samp <

 ) and finally a third range
of payoffs where imitation always occurs (i.e. 
9
N own
;
N samp <
 ).
Note that one or even two of these ranges can vanish, i.e. we can specify stochastic as well
as deterministic rules. An example for a deterministic rule (‘switch if better’) is
9PO
Q$R ;
O
QTS ;
O
Q$U
<
^

9

;
0
¯
Q ;
¯
Q
< with ¯Q . An example for a rule that implies always stochastic behaviour for the
game given in 2 is
9PO
Q$R ;
O
QTS ;
O
Q$U
<
^

9



;
0
¯
Q ;
¯
Q
< with 

9]`
¯
Q
<
D
max
9ba /ca
;
a
1
a
;>
< .
Notice also that our parameter
O
Q$R is similar to the aspiration level d from the global model
studied in Binmore and Samuelson (1994). However, the learning rules studied in Binmore
and Samuelson are not special cases of our learning rules, since their decisions are perturbed
by exogenous noise. For cases where this noise term becomes small our rule approximates
Binmore and Samuelson (1994) with
9PO
Q$R
;
O
QTS
;
O
Q$U
<
^

9
d
;
0
¯
Q
;
¯
Q
< and ¯Q .
Normalisation We map parameters
9PO
QffiR
;
O
QTS
;
O
Q$U
<
7 V
into
9
QffiR
;
QTS
;
Q$U
<
7fe

;>g
V
using the
following rule:
O
Q
ih tan j Q  0
j

k$l
7nm

;>	;
po
_ (5)




`
0

0

0

0
`

_



_



_rq


_


Q

O
Q

We let evolution operate on the normalised values
9
Q$R
;
QTS
;
Q$U
<
7se

;>g
V for the following reason:
The learning rules from the literature are often deterministic, thus, they can be represented as
rules whose parameter values
O
Q

are infinitely large or small respectively. We do not want to
exclude these rules a priori. However, it might be a problem for a dynamics that selects learning
rules to converge within the limits of a finite simulation to infinite values of the parameters. We
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therefore map the unbounded space of parameters of our learning rules into a bounded space
using the transformation given by equation 5 on the preceding page.
Mutations When a player learns a repeated game strategy, sometimes learning fails and a
random strategy is learned instead. In this case, any repeated game strategy, as described in
section 2.3, is selected with equal probability. These ‘mutations’ occur with a fixed probability
t
I . We consider mutation rates between  and  _rq .
We introduce mutations in order to show that simulations are particularly robust. However,
as we see in section 3.4, we do not need mutations for our results.
Mutations can also be seen as a way to compensate for the limited size of our population.
Even if all members of one species die out the species still has a chance to enter the population
again through a mutation.
2.5 Exogenous Dynamics that Select Learning Rules
From time to time a player has the opportunity to revise the learning rule. In our simulations
we assume that this opportunity is a random event that occurs for each player independently
with probability 
 u . Ju , thus, denotes the average time between two updates of a player. We
consider learning rates 
 Ju among 

`


 to 

`

 . If not mentioned otherwise 
 u 


`


 . In particular learning rules are updated much slower than updates of strategies or
changes of games.
We want to model a situation where updates of learning rules occur very rarely. We find it
justified that for these rare events players make a larger effort to select a new learning rule. For
our model this has the following two implications: All neighbours are sampled when updating
learning rules (and not only a single neighbour as for update of strategies) and the sampled data
is evaluated more efficiently, using now a quadratic approximation.
The shape of the neighbourhoods that are used to update learning rules is similar to those
used for interaction and learning (see graph 1 on page 3). We denote the size of the neighbour-
hood for update of learning rules with the symbol  u .
A player who updates the learning rule has the following information for all neighbours
individually (including him- or herself):
1. The (normalised) parameters of the respective learning rule Q$R ; QTS ; Q$U .
2. The average payoff per interaction that the respective player received while this learning
rule was used, N
9
Q$R
;
QvS
;
QffiU
< .
To evaluate this information we assume that players estimate a model that helps them explaining
their environment, in particular their payoffs. Players then use this model to choose an optimal
8
learning rule. To model this decision process we assume that players approximate a quadratic
function of the learning parameters to explain success of a learning rule. Formally the quadratic
function can be written as follows:
N
9
Q$R ; QTS ; Q$U
<
w Y
9
Q$R ; QTS ; Q$U
<
x
R
x
S
x
U
Y
Y
9
Q$R ; QTS ; Q$U
<
y
RzR
y
RJS
y
R{U
y
RJS
y
SzS
y
S|U
y
RzU
y
S}U
y
U{U
QffiR
QvS
QffiU
Y!~ (6)
Players make an OLS-estimation to derive the parameters of this model ( ~ describes the noise).
We choose a quadratic function because it is one of the simplest models which still has an
optimum. Similarly we assume that players derive this model using an OLS-estimation because
this is a simple and canonical way of aggregating the information players have. We do not want
to be taken too literally: We want to model players that more or less behave as if they would
maximise a quadratic model which is derived using an OLS-estimation.
The OLS-Regression determines the parameters ( w$; x R ; x S ; x U ; y RzR ; ___ ; y UzU ) of the above
model. Given this model, the player determines the combination of QffiR ; QTS ; Q$U that maximises
N
9
Q$R
;
QvS
;
QffiU
< s.t.
9
Q$R
;
QTS
;
Q$U
<
74e

;>g
V
. We find that in 99% of all updates the Hessian of
N
9
Q$R
;
QvS
;
QffiU
< is negative definite, i.e. N
9
Q$R
;
QTS
;
Q$U
< has a unique local maximum. In the re-
maining less than 1% of all updates the quadratic model might be unreliable. In this case we
therefore copy the most successful neighbour.
Figure 2 shows (only for one dimension) an example for a sample of several pairs of a pa-
rameter Q  and a payoff N (black dots) together with the respective estimation of the functional
relationship (gray line) between Q  and N .
Mutations We also introduce mutations for players’ learning rules. When a player updates
the learning rule, with a small probability t I not the above described update scheme is used
but the player learns a random learning rule that is chosen following an equal distribution (for
the normalised parameters) over
9
QffiR
;
QvS
;
QffiU
<
7#e

;>g
V
, which is equivalent to a random and
independent selection of
O
Q$R
,
O
QTS
,
O
Q$U following each a Cauchy distribution. We consider mutation
rates for learning t I between  and  _rq .
The reason to introduce mutations at this level is the same as given above for mutation of
strategies: We want to show that our simulation results are robust. A population that due to
its limited size gets stuck in some state may always escape through a mutation. Mutations are,
9
Q 
N
QT

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•• • •
•
••
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Figure 2: An example for samples of pairs of parameters and payoffs (black) which are used to
estimate a functional relationship (gray) between Q  and N . Given this relationship an optimal
value Q  is determined.
thus, a way to compensate for the fact that our simulations are done with a relatively small
population (only 25 to 40 000 members).
However, as we show in section 3.4, we neither need mutations on the level of strategies nor
on the level of players’ learning rules. Results without mutations are very simular to the ones
with a small amount of mutations.
2.6 Initial Configuration
At the beginning of each simulation each player starts with a random learning rule that is chosen
following an equal distribution over
9
Q$R
;
QTS
;
Q$U
<
7Ee

;>g
V
. Thus, the parameters
O
QffiR
,
O
QTS
,
O
Q$U are
distributed independently following a Cauchy distribution. Also each player starts with a ran-
dom repeated game strategy, again following an equal distribution over the available strategies.
3 Results with Endogenous Learning Rules
3.1 Distribution over Learning Parameters
Figure 3 displays averages over 53 simulations on a      grid, lasting 400 000 periods each.
Since we can not display a distribution over the three-dimensional space
9
Q$R
;
QTS
;
Q$U
< we
analyse two different projections into subspaces. The left part of figure 3 displays the distribu-
tion over
9
QTS
;
Q$U
< , the right part over
9
Q$R
;
QTSYQ$U
< respectively. Axes range from  to  for
Q$R
,
QTS and Q$U and from  to  in the case of QTSiYQ$U . Labels on the axes do not represent the
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Figure 3: Long run distribution over parameters of the learning rule  ffip>TŁ>$ . Average over
53 simulations runs on a torus of size     with 2-state automata. Neighbourhoods have
sizes 6  ,  . Relative frequencies are given as percentages. Simulations last
for *




periods, interactions take place with probability  ¡ 
¢  , repeated game
strategies are learned from a randomly sampled player with probability 
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 , learning
rules are changed with probability 
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
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, mutations both for repeated game strategies and for learning rules occur at a rate
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¢



.
normalised values but instead $ , TŁ , $ which range from  to  .6
Both pictures are simultaneously a density plot and a table of relative frequencies:
Density plot: Different densities of the distribution are represented by different shades of gray.
The highest density is represented by the darkest gray.7
Table of relative frequencies: The pictures in figure 3 also contains a table of relative fre-
quencies. The left picture is divided into eight sectors, the right picture is divided into
six rectangles. The percentages within each sector or rectangle represent the amount of
players that use a learning rule with parameters in the respective range.
The left part of figure 3 shows two interesting properties of endogenous evolution: First, with
endogenous evolution learning rules are sensitive to a player’s own payoff. Second, they are
6The figure is derived from a table of frequencies with ¨ª©¬«¨ª© cells. The scaling of all axes follows the
normalisation given in equation 5 on page 7. To be precise, the value “ ­®°¯²± ­®ª³ ” represents actually ´¶µ tan ·¹¸ºµ»· ®°¯²±
®¼³½¿¾
´ZÀÁ¸
¾
´
½ and not ­®°¯	± ­®¼³ . In the current context this difference should be negligible.
7Densities are derived from a table of frequencies with a grid of size ¨ª©T«i¨²© for each picture. We actually map
logs of densities into different shades of gray. The interval between the log of the highest density and the log of
1% of the highest density is split into seven ranges of even width. Densities with logs in the same interval have the
same shade of gray. Thus, the white area represents densities smaller than 1% of the maximal density while areas
with darker shades of gray represent densities larger than 1.9%, 3.7% 7.2%, 14%, 27% and 52% of the maximal
density respectively.
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substantially less sensitive to observed payoffs. We call this latter property suspicion. Of course,
our agents can only behave as if they had feelings like suspicion. We still hope that the image
helps the reader.
Sensitivity to own payoffs: Remember that the initial distribution over ÂTÃ and Â$Ä is an equal
distribution. Thus, would we draw the left part of figure 3 in period one, the result would
be a smooth gray surface without any mountains or valleys. Starting from this initial
distribution our learning parameters change substantially. Even if not in all cases ÅÂvÃ
becomes Æ , the distribution over learning parameters puts most its weight on small
values of ÂvÃ .
Insensitivity to sampled payoffs: In the left part of figure 3 we see that 96.3% of all players
use a learning rule with ÇÈÅÂ$Ä²Ç¶ÉÊÇÈÅÂvÃËÇ , i.e. a learning rule which puts more weight on the
player’s own payoff than on the sampled payoff.
If we restrict ourselves to ‘reasonable’ learning rules with ÅÂTÃÉÍÌ and ÅÂffiÄ¥ÎÌ then 97.5%
of all these rules have the property that ÇÈÅÂffiÄ²ÇÏÉÐÇÈÅÂTÃËÇ .
Notice that for both cases the initial distribution over parameters of the learning rule
implies that 50% of all rules fulfil ÇÈÅÂ$Ä²Ç¼ÉÑÇÈÅÂvÃËÇ .
We call this kind of behaviour ‘suspicious’ in the following sense: A sampling player
may realise that an observed learning rule is successful for a neighbour. Nevertheless
the player does not know whether the same rule is equally successful at the player’s
own location. Perhaps the success of a neighbour’s rule depends on players which are
neighbours of the player’s neighbour, but not of the player. Thus, a ‘suspicious’ player
behaves like somebody who ‘fears’ that the sampled neighbour’s experience can not be
generalised for the player’s own case.
3.2 Probabilities to switch to a sampled learning rule
The learning rule as specified in equation 3 on page 6 determines for each learning player a
probability to switch to the observed repeated game strategy. Figure 4 on the following page
shows the cumulative distribution of these switching probabilities.8
The horizontal axis represents ÅÂ$Ò	Ó5ÅÂTÃÕÔ own Ó5ÅÂ$Ä,Ô samp. Following the learning rule 3 a player
switches stochastically with probability ÅÂ$Ò°ÓGÅÂTÃÕÔ own ÓGÅÂ$Ä,Ô samp if this expression is between zero
and one. Otherwise the player either switches with certainty or not at all.
8This figure is derived from a table of frequencies with 30 cells. The scaling of the horizontal axis follows the
normalisation given in equation 5 on page 7.
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Figure 4: Cumulative distribution over switching probabilities, given the learning rules from
figure 3.
Figure 4 shows that only in about 12% of all learning events ÌÉEÅÂ$Ò°ÓAÅÂTÃ»Ô own ÓAÅÂ$Ä,Ô samp É
Ù
,
i.e. in only 12% of all learning events a player’s decision is a stochastic one. Our endogenous
rules seem to be neither fully stochastic9 nor fully deterministic10
3.3 Comparison with other Learning Rules
Above we mentioned two reference points for learning rules: Those learning rules that are
assumed as exogenous and fixed in the literature on local evolution and rules that turn out to be
optimal in a global setting.
Let us start with the exogenous rules that are assumed in the literature on local evolution:
We have seen that the exogenous fixed rules may be similar to the endogenous learning rules
in the sense that small changes in the player’s own payoff may lead to drastic changes in the
probability to adopt a new strategy. Endogenous learning rules differ from those studied in parts
of the literature on local evolution in the sense that changes in an observed player’s payoff lead
to smaller changes in the probability to adopt a new strategy.
Let us next compare our endogenous rules with those rules that turn out to be optimal in
a global setting11. We may expect that the outcome of an evolutionary process that runs only
for a finite time is at least close to any optimal rule. However, our rules differ in two respects
from those that are optimal in a global model: First, as discussed in section 3.1, they are more
sensitive to changes in a learning player’s own payoff than to changes in an observed neighbours
payoff. Second, as mentioned in section 3.2, players following endogenous rules quite often
9As those from Bo¨rgers, Sarin (1995) and Schlag (1993).
10As those from Axelrod (1984, p. 158ff), Nowak and May (1992), etc.
11See Bo¨rgers and Sarin (1995), Schlag (1993, 1994).
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switch with certainty.
A higher sensitivity to a player’s own payoff as compared to an observed neighbours payoff
can be related to the local structure. A strategy that is successful in my neighbour’s neighbour-
hood may be less successful in my own neighbourhood. Therefore my neighbour’s payoff is a
less reliable source of information than my own payoff.
The fact the (globally) optimal learning rules switch always stochastically results from the
attempt to evaluate information efficiently. Even small differences in payoffs are translated into
different behaviour. The price to pay for this efficient evaluation is time. Given that neither
in Bo¨rgers and Sarin nor in Schlag players are impatient, they do not care whether the optimal
strategy is reached only after infinite time.
While we do not have an explicit discount factor in our simulations discounting enters im-
plicitly through the regular update of the learning rule. A learning rule that is efficient, but slow,
compares (within finite time) badly to a learning rule that is not perfect in the long run, but
achieves already good results in the short run. Therefore evolution of learning rules at a more
than infinitesimal speed may lead to deterministic behaviour.
3.4 Dependence on Parameters
The discussion in the previous paragraphs was based on a particular parameter combination. In
the following we want to show that parameter changes do not matter for our main results.
We will first consider in section 3.4.1 an alternative rule to sample neighbours that might be
copied when learning. Section 3.4.2 then studies changes in the other parameters.
3.4.1 The Selection Rule: Sampling Randomly or Selectively
Above we assumed that players learn repeated game strategies from a randomly sampled player.
One might, however, object that players could be more careful in selecting their samples. As
a benchmark case we assume in this section that players sample the most successful neighbour
available12. We show that this change in the selection rule has little influence on the endogenous
learning rules.
Figure 5 on the following page shows a distribution over ÛÕÂffiÒÝÜ>ÂvÃÜ>ÂffiÄÞ , projected into the
ÂTÃÏÜ>Â$Ä and Â$ÒßÜ>ÂTÃvÓÚÂ$Ä space, similar to figure 3 on page 11. In contrast to figure 3 we assume
here that players, when learning, sample the player with the highest payoff per interaction for
the current repeated game strategy, measured over the lifetime of the respective repeated game
strategy.
12I.e. the neighbour whose repeated game strategy yields the highest payoff on average (per interaction) since
the point in time where the neighbour learned the respective strategy.
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Figure 5: Long run distribution over parameters of the learning rule
ÛÕÂffiÒpÜ>ÂTÃÜ>ÂffiÄÞ
. Average
over 181 simulations runs, each lasting for 400 000 periods. Relative frequencies are given as
percentages. Parameters are as in figure 3 on page 11 except that learning players sample the
most successful neighbour.
While the picture is more noisy than figure 3 properties of learning rules are the same as
already discussed in section 3.1 on page 10. Players are rather sensitive to changes in their own
payoff and less sensitive to changes in the sampled neighbours payoff.
We suspect that the additional noise stems from the reduced evolutionary pressure on learn-
ing rules. Preselecting already ‘best’ learning rules for comparison makes the task of identifying
good rules too easy for learning rules. We actually observe a cluster of learning rules with val-
ues of
ÅÂ$Ä
close to
Ó
. These rules apparently follow a ‘just copy whatever you see’ strategy,
which might be reasonable, since ‘whatever you see’ is already the best available in your neigh-
bourhood under this selection rule.
3.4.2 Other Parameter Changes
Figure 6 on page 17 shows the effect of various changes of the other parameters. We always start
from the same parameter combination as a reference point and then vary one of the parameters
keeping all the others fixed. The reference point is a simulation on torus of size ×	Ì¬áA×	Ì , where
the interaction neighbourhood and learning neighbourhood have both the same size âãiä!âå§ä
Ù
while the neighbourhood that is used when updating the learning rule has size âæAäç . To learn a
new repeated game strategy players sample a neighbour randomly. Learning occurs on average
every èåäéç
ê periods13. The underlying game is changed every è
ë?ä:ç Ì
Ì
Ì periods. Players
13Remember that we assume learning to be an independent random event that occurs for each player with
probability ìîíbïñð .
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update their learning rule on average every èæGä!ê Ì
Ì
Ì periods14. The mutation rate for learning
as well as for update of learning rules is ò åºä ò æóä
Ù
ô
Ù
Ì
Ì . Simulations last for è*õZäsê ÌZÌ
Ì
Ì
periods. Thus, except for the simulation length, parameters are the same as those for figure 3.
Figure 6 on the following page shows averages15 of ÅÂvÃ and ÅÂ$Ä for various changes in the
parameters. Each dot represents a parameter combination the we simulated. To ease the under-
standing of the underlying pattern, dots are connected through interpolated splines. The white
dot in each diagram represents the average value ( ¯ÅÂTÃ ä Æ Ù Ö÷ö
ø , ¯ÅÂ$Ä ä Ì
ÖØù	Ì ) for the reference set
of parameters described above. The line ¯ÅÂúÄ ä Æ ¯ÅÂTÃ is marked in gray.
The main result is that all parameter combinations show again relative sensitivity to own
payoffs, and insensitivity to observed payoffs. In particular the averages ¯ÅÂ$ÄûÉüÆ ¯ÅÂvÃ for all
parameter combinations that we simulated.
Notice that we do not need mutations for our results, however, the simulations are robust
against mutations. To show that we can dispense with both kinds of mutations simultaneously
we ran a simulation where ò åiä ò æAä Ì and show the result in the graph ‘mutation of learning
rules’ with a small triangle. While learning on average to a smaller value of ÅÂ$Ä we have still
¯
ÅÂ$ÄGÉÆ
¯
ÅÂTÃ . On the other hand we can introduce rather large probabilities of mutations (up to
0.7) and still have ¯ÅÂúÄÁÉÆ ¯ÅÂTÃ .
In the remainder of this subsection we want to discuss the dependence on parameters in
more detail. To do that we distinguish three dimensions how parameters influence learning
rules: Relative speed, relative efficiency, and relative degree of locality.
If parameters of the simulation are chosen in a way that makes it slow, or inefficient (e.g. due
to a lot of noise), the distribution over the parameters of the learning rule remains close to the
initial distribution (which has averages ¯ÅÂvÃ ä Ì , ¯ÅÂ$Ä ä Ì ).
If the parameters of a simulation describe a situation that has less aspects of locality (e.g. the
interaction radius is large, such that almost everybody interacts with everybody else) ‘suspi-
cious’ behaviour disappears, and averages for Æ ¯ÅÂTÃ and Æ ¯ÅÂffiÄ moves closer to symmetric values,
i.e. moves closer to the gray line where ¯ÅÂ$Ä ä Æ ¯ÅÂTÃ .
Table 1 on page 18 summarises the effects of the parameters on these three dimensions.
Let us briefly discuss some of the dependencies on parameters:
Locality: The parameters è*ë , èå , ò å , âå , ý , and þ influence ‘locality’ in the sense that players
becomes either more similar or more diverse in the evolutionary process. As a consequence
14We also assume update of learning rules to be an independent random event that occurs for each player with
probability ìîíbïñß .
15These averages are arithmetic averages of   and   respectively, taken over 20 different simulations runs that
are initialised randomly. The average values of   and   are then transformed into

  and

  using equation 5
on page 7.
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Figure 6: Dependence of ÅÂTÃ and ÅÂffiÄ on the parameters of the learning rule.
Dots represent averages over the last 20% of 20 simulation runs respectively, each lasting
for 40 000 periods. The white circle in each diagram represents averages of the reference
parameters: ×	Ì8ás×	Ì torus, sample a random player, èJåä ç
ê , èJæ ä ê Ì
Ì
Ì , è*ëÐä ç Ì
Ì
Ì ,
ò
åä
ò
æAä
Ù
ô
Ù
Ì
Ì , è
õiäê ÌZÌ
Ì
Ì , âãiä!âåiä
Ù
, âæAä!ç , ý ä!ç .
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Table 1: Effects of simulation parameters on properties of learning rules.
Ó and Æ denote the direction of the effect an increase of a parameter has on speed, efficiency
or locality.
parameters that we attribute more ‘locality’ in the following also lead to more weight on a
player’s own experience, i.e. more ‘suspicion’, thus, the ratio ¯ÅÂTÃ
ô
¯
ÅÂffiÄ is smaller.
When games change rarely (i.e. è*ë is large) or when player learn frequently (i.e. èå is small)
players have a better chance to find the ‘long-run’ strategy for a given game and, thus, become
more similar, which reduces locality. Diversity among players may also be reduced by ‘back-
ground noise’ ò å since noise makes players more similar. Farsightedness (âå ), when learning,
increases the effects of locality since it exposes learning players to samples that are more likely
to be in a different situation. (This shows that being able to spot locality is actually one of its
prerequisites). Likewise, situations become more diverse when the interaction neighbourhood
âã is small. Another source of heterogeneity is complexity of strategies, since this determines di-
versity of players’ capabilities. More heterogeneity can finally also be due to a larger population
(þ ).
Speed: The parameters è*õ , èJæ , and âæ influence the speed of the evolutionary process in the
sense that they affect the frequency or the size of evolutionary steps of the learning rules. More
speed allows learning rules to move away from the initial distribution (which has averages of
the parameters of the learning rule ¯ÅÂvÃ ä Ì , ¯ÅÂ$Ä ä Ì ), thus, move farther to the left in the diagram.
The longer our simulations run (è
õ ), the more time learning rules have to develop and to
move away from the initial distribution. Also, the more frequently we update learning rules
(i.e. the larger èJæ ), the faster learning rules evolve and move away from the initial distribution.
The farther we see (âæ ) when updating a learning rule, the faster successful learning rules spread
18
through the population.
Noise: The parameters èå , èJæ , ò å , ò æ may make the evolutionary process more ‘noisy’ in the
sense that the direction of moves of learning rules becomes more random. This again keeps
averages of the parameters of the learning rules closer to the initial distribution.
The more rarely learning rules are used to select strategies (i.e. the larger èJå ), the less they
gain experience, and the more they remain close to the initial distribution. The more rarely we
update learning rules (i.e. the larger èæ ), the more data is available to evaluate a learning rule,
thus, the less noisy its development. The more strategies are perturbed when they are learned
( ò å ), the less it is possible to evaluate a learning rule’s impact on success. The more learning
rules are perturbed during the update process ( ò æ ), the more they are pushed back to the initial
distribution.
Notice, however, that changes in a some parameter may have conflicting effects. One example
is the speed to update learning rules èæ : For very small values of èJæ learning rules are updated
too often to accumulate a reasonable amount of data on the success the rule. As a consequence
the evolutionary process it too noisy to move away from their initial distribution. For very large
values of èæ the data concerning the performance of learning rules might be rather reliable,
however, individual learning becomes slow. This again means that learning rules do not manage
to move away from their initial distribution.
In other words: Updating a learning rule implies taking advantage of information that is
provided by neighbours while simultaneously ceasing to provide the information that the re-
spective individual has collected in the past. Of course in the long run also an updating player is
a source of information again, but at least in the short run updates are bad for the neighbourhood
but good for the individual. This effect explains the turn in the èæ -curve.
Still, the discussion of figure 6 shows that whatever parameters we choose, learning rules
turn out to have similar properties. Further, the dependence of learning rules on parameters
seems to be fairly intuitive.
3.5 Stage Game Behaviour
In the previous sections we were concerned with the immediate properties of endogenous learn-
ing rules. In the following we want to analyse the impact that endogenous rules have on stage
game behaviour.
Figure 7 on the next page shows proportions of stage game strategies for various games
both for endogenous and for fixed learning rules. In simulations represented in figure 7 the
underlying game changes every è
ëä ç Ì
Ì
Ì periods. We know from other simulations that
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during these 2000 periods strategies should have adapted to the new game16. Just before the
game changes we determine the proportion of stage game strategies ý and G . These proportions
are represented in figure 7 as circles. The position of the circle is determined by the parameters
of the game, H and I . The colour of the circle is white if the proportion of ý s is larger and black
otherwise.
Figure 7 compares two cases: An exogenously given learning rule of the ‘switch if bet-
ter’ type, approximated as ÛPÅÂffiÒÝÜ ÅÂvÃÜ,ÅÂffiÄÞ ä Û»Ì	Ü>Æ
Ù
Ì
ÌZÌ
Ì
Ì	Ü
Ù
Ì
ÌÌ
Ì
Ì
Þ and the case of endogenous
learning rules.
In both pictures two areas can be distinguished. One area where most of the simulations
lead to a majority of ý and another one where most simulations lead to a majority of G . We
make two observations:
F The fixed learning rule ‘switch if better’, which is an approximation of the learning rules
studied in the literature on local evolution with fixed learning rules17, leads to results that
are very similar to those observed in the literature.
– There is cooperation for a substantial range of prisoners’ dilemmas. Actually 30.3%
of the 142 prisoners’ dilemmas in this simulation lead to a majority of cooperating
players.
– In coordination games players do not follow the principle of risk dominance but
another principle which is between risk dominance and Pareto dominance18.
F Under endogenous learning the range of prisoners’ dilemmas where most players co-
operate shrinks to 10.2% of the 137 prisoner’s dilemmas in the respective simulation.
Behaviour in coordination games again does not follow risk dominance.
The first point is interesting to note, because it shows that the model that we study in this paper
is comparable with the models studied in the literature on local evolution with fixed learning
rules.
The second point shows that properties of network evolution discussed in the literature on
local evolution with fixed learning rules persist, at least to some smaller degree, even with
endogenous learning rules.
16See Kirchkamp (1995).
17See Axelrod (1984, p. 158ff), Lindgren and Nordahl (1994), Nowak and May (1992, 1993), Nowak, Bonho-
effer and May (1993), Eshel, Samuelson and Shaked (1996), and Kirchkamp (1995).
18A very similar behaviour is found for the fixed learning rule ‘copy the best strategy found in the neighbour-
hood’ in Kirchkamp (1995).
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4 Conclusions
In this paper we studied properties of endogenously evolving learning rules and the stage game
behaviour that is implied by these rules. We compared endogenously evolving learning rules
both with rules that are assumed in standard models on local evolution19 as well as with those
that turn out to be optimal in a global context20.
Regarding the first comparison we find that our dynamics selects rules which are different
from the ones commonly assumed in the literature on local evolution. In particular the learning
rules which are selected following our dynamics are much less sensitive to changes in a sampled
player’s payoff. This ‘suspicion’ can be related to the fact that the sampled player’s environment
is different from the learning player’s one.
Comparing endogenous rules from local evolution with optimal rules from a global model
we find two differences: Endogenous rules are not symmetric and they often imply deterministic
behaviour. The lack of symmetry in the learning rule is analogous to the lack of symmetry in a
learning player’s and the respective neighbours situation. The deterministic behaviour is a result
of the lack of patience which is a consequence of the more than infinitesimal learning speed.
As far as the stage game behaviour is concerned we find that important properties of stage
game behaviour, like cooperation for some prisoners’ dilemmas and coordination not on risk
dominant equilibria, is present both with fixed learning rules specified in the literature and with
our endogenous learning rules, however, with endogenous rules to a more limited degree.
Besides the selection dynamics that we present here we have also analysed other selection
dynamics. In Kirchkamp and Schlag (1995) we study dynamics where players use less sophis-
ticated update rules than the OLS-model used in this paper. We have analysed models where
players move only in the direction of the maximum of the OLS model, but do not adopt the es-
timate of the optimal rule immediately. Further we have analysed models where players do not
estimate any model at all but instead copy successful neighbours. Both alternative specifications
lead to similar properties of learning rules: Switching probabilities are less sensitive to changes
in payoff of the neighbour and more sensitive to changes in payoffs of the learning player. Also
properties of the induced stage game behaviour are similar: Both alternative specifications lead
to cooperation for some prisoners’ dilemmas and coordination not on risk dominant equilibria.
Thus, we can regard the above results as fairly robust.
19See Axelrod (1984, p. 158ff), Lindgren and Nordahl (1994), Nowak and May (1992, 1993), Nowak, Bonho-
effer and May (1993), Eshel, Samuelson and Shaked (1996), and Kirchkamp (1995).
20See Bo¨rgers and Sarin (1995), Schlag (1993, 1994).
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